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11 



PARTICULAR ACCOUNT 



BATTLE 



3^-ttWifef ir<^ 0V Mm$Wu W^iUi 



17TH OF JUNE, 1775. 



BY A CITIZEN OF BOSTON. 



Setoutu ISinttion. 



BOSTON : 

PUBLISHED BY CUMMINGS, HILLIARD, fy COMPANY. 

PRINTED BY MUNEOE AND FRANCIS. 

1825. 
L . 



";^^v \ \^ 



xiDVERTISEMENT. 



As there have been several accounts, heretofore given, of 
the Battle of Bunker Hill, it may be thought unnecessary 
again to bring the subject before the public, and impossible to 
say any thing of importance, not to be found in former nar- 
ratives. It may be observed, that some of those accounts have 
been found to be partial and incomplete ; and that some were 
written, not so much for the purpose of giving a correct view 
of all the events, as to establish particular facts, before denied 
or doubted. It has been suggested that a more particular 
yet brief statement of that enterprize would be acceptable to 
the public at this time. Inquiries are often made on the sub- 
ject, and are likely to be repeated, as a formal celebration of 
that ever-memorable event is soon to take place. 

The most correct and perfect account, which has been giv- 
en, was by Colonel S. Swett, by way of Appendix to a second 
edition of the Life of General Israel Putnam, pubhshed 
about seven years ago. The design of the writer of the fol- 
lowing narrative is to give a concise statement, and yet to 
record whatever is material and important. Having examined 
and compared all former accounts with dihgence, and received 
some addhional statements, he believes that it will not be con- 
sidered a mere republication of other and earlier accounts. 
He has confined himself to the transactions of the day and the 
event, with reference only to some circumstances closely con- 
nected therewith ; nor has he indulged in any remarks which 
belong more properly to the historian or to the orator. 

Boston, May 20th, 1825. 



BATTLE 



BUNKER OR BREED'S HILL. 



The battle in Charlestown, Massachusetts, which 
was fought between the British and Americans, on 
the 17th of June, 1775, was an event of great in- 
terest, and importance. It was the first real trial of 
strength and courage between the troops of the parent 
country and of the provinces. The affair at Lexing- 
ton and Concord, on the 19th of April preceding, 
could hardly be called a battle. Though a few guns 
were fired by the militia assembled under arms at 
Lexington, after they were attacked, yet no attempt 
was made by them to oppose the march of the Brit- 
ish, who were ten times more numerous.* And at 



* General Heath says, " The British advanced towards the militia, ordered 
them to disperse, huzzaed, and fired upon them. Several were killed and 
wounded, and tlie rest dispersed." Gordon says, " The huzzaing: and firing 
produced an immtdiate dispersion ; though some of the milita fired before, 
or as they were dispersing." The British account was, "that the militia, 
when ordered to disperse, immediately retire.! in confusion ; but that sev- 
eral guns were fired upon the king's troops from behind the stone wall ; by 
which one man was wounded, and Majer Pitcairn's horse was shot." Mrs. 
Warren says, " The British made an attack upon the defenceless peasants at 
Lexington — iliat Colonel Smith ordered them to lay down their arms and 
disperse ; at the same time ordered his troops to fire, and proceeded without 
molestation to Concord." 



Concord Bridge, where a part of the British troops 
was opposed with much spirit and bravery, there was 
nothing really deserving the name of <i formal battle. 
The British were pursued, indeed, on their return to 
Boston, but in a very irregular manner, as the militia 
collected on the occasion were not sufficiently nume- 
rous to justify them in offering a serious contest. But 
that at BreecVs HiW was a hard-fought battle. Large 
detachments of American and British troops were 
closely engaged in martial combat for several hours* 
The contest was most severe and bloody. A fair tri- 
al was exhibited of the military /?oi(;e?'5 of each. 

It would seem that a battle must have been expect- 
ed by the Americans ; yet so little was done by way 
of previous preparation, and so unequal were they in 
discipline, in arms, and in numbers, to meet the Brit- 
ish, that it may be considered by some as a rash and 
imprudent measure to challenge an engagement as 
they did. The event indeed, proved their courage 
and heroism, notwithstanding their final defeat. 
They contended against the enemy with a desperate 
resolution, as if the liberties of their country depended 
upon the issue of that single battle. And, perhaps, 
it is not too much to say, that it did so in a great de- 
gree. 

The British received a formidable check. They 
had melancholy evidence of the resolution and brave- 



* The first attack was madf between two and tlirce o'clock ! and the 
Araericans did not retreat till after six o'clock. It is said, iii a letter from a 
British officer, that the battle continued nearly four hours. 



ry of the provincial troops. From that battle, they 
learned to appreciate aright the character of Ameri- 
cans. They were convinced of the great suffering 
and bloodshed w hich would attend the contest in 
which they were engaged. And, from that day, they 
feared to attempt (Avhat, if they had attempted, might 
have proved most disastrous to the American cause) 
an attack upon our undisciplined troops, and which, as 
a regular army, furnished ^llth all necessary military 
stores and arms, they ought to have done. 

We have suggested, that the battle of Breed's Hill 
was a rash affair on the part of the Americans. It 
was so considered, at the time, by many judicious 
men in the Provincial Congress and Committee of 
Safety, though the majority of the laiteif. did finally 
sanction the enterprise. Even Warren, ardent and 
resolute as he was, considered it a desperate undertak- 
ing. No reasonable man could have supposed that 
the Americans would maintain their position so near 
Boston, where the British had 10,000 regular troops, 
and when they had command of the waters of Charles 
river by their ships of war. Had the latter been as 
successful as they had reason to calculate, they would, 
with the troops* they landed at Charlestown, have 



* There are different accounts of the number of British troops engaged ia 
this battle. Some have stated them to be three, and others, five thousand. 
General Gage, in his oflicial account, said there were about 2000. By com- 
paring several early statements, it appears that somewhat more than 3000 
first landed at Charlestown, and made two attacks upon the Americans ; and 
that about 1000 passed over, afterwards, as a reinforcement ; and, joining 
those of the first detachment who survived, made the third attack, when the 
redoubt was carried. 



8 

driven the Americansf from their works (which afford- 
ed but a partial shelter, almost destitute as they were 
of cannon as well as of powder ;) and pursued them 
to Cambridge, where General Ward was stationed 
with the main body of the provincial troops ; who 
would probably have been routed by such a powerful 
force. 

The plan of taking possession of the heights of 
Charlestown was adoptedl, in consequence of intelli- 
gence that the British general intended to occupy that 
position, and also the high land on Dorchester Neck, 
on the south of Boston, in order to extend his situa- 
tion, and to take advantage of possessing these com- 
manding places, to attack the provincials at Cambridge 
or Roxbury, whenever he might think it proper.* It 



t The whole number of provincials engaged did not, probably, much ex- 
ceed 2000. Some, indeed, have supposed there were only about 1500. 
Those who went on to Breed's Hill the evening of the 16th, have usually been 
estimated at 1000 : being PrcscotVs, parts of Bridge's and Frye's regiments, 
a detachment of 120, with four lieutenants, from General Pulnains regiment, 
under command of Captain Knowlton ; and one artillery company. 
The regiments, at tliis time, consisted ef ten companies of six- 
ty men each ; but very /ew of them were full. Tlie reinforcements, which 
were sent on the next day, though belonging to several regiments, did not 
probably exceed 12 or 1300, (and some of these arrived only in time to 
protect and cover the retreat.) These consisie<? of two regiments from New 
Hampshire, under Stark and Reed ; two more companies of Putnam's regi- 
ment, commanded by Chester andClark ; parts of Little's,Whilcomb's, Brew- 
er'i, JV'f.ron s, Gerrisli's,and Garrfner'* regiments, the latter of which was not 
ordered on to the field till a late hour, and after the first attack of the Brit- 
ish, though its brave commander was anxious to march at the first alarm. 
Thorc is proof that only parts, even of these incomplete regiments, were in 
the hattle. 

* Soon after the afiair at Lexington and Concord, of the 19th of April, 
the " minute men" (so called) and others, to the number of about 15,000 
assembled in the vicinity of Boston. Manv of them were without efficierrt 



was not until the 15th of Jane that the Americans de- 
termined to occupy the former spot. Why more time 
was not allowed for preparation is not known. It is 
probable there was an apprehension that the British 
intended to take immediate possession.* 

The detachments ordered upon this most hazardous 
enterprise consisted of about 1000 men, under the par- 
ticular and immediate command of Colonel William 



and complete equipments. In powder they were very deficient. And as to 
artillery, it was little more than a name. Of these men, nearly 10,000 be- 
longed to Massachusetts ; Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island 
furnished the residue. General Ward was appointed commander in chief by 
the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts ; General Thomas was second in 
command, and was stationed at Roxbury. Washington had not taken the 
chief command. He was appointed, about the middle of June, by the Con- 
tinental Congress, and arrived at Cambridge on the 3d of July ; when the 
troops were soon organized as a national army. It is probable, however, 
that, before he took the command, all the troops collected acknowledged 
General Ward as chief ; and that there was an understanding to act in con- 
cert, and with some regularity and system, though the organization of the 
troops was not perfect. A contrary supposition would imply extreme, inat- 
tention or want of military knowledge, both in the Committee of Safety 
and in the officers assembled ; several of whom had been in the campaigns 
of 1756, 1757, and 1758. 

* It is said by those who were then living, and in a situation to know all 
the circumstances connected with the enterprise, that it was undertaken at 
the particular instance of General Putnam, and that Colonel Piescott re- 
quested to have the post, in which he so bravely distinguished himself. Put- 
nam expressed the opinion, that something must be done (unprepared as 
they then were for offensive operations), to employ the men and to accustom 
them to military service. He conducted the expedition to Noddle's and 
Hog Islands, in Boston harbour, the last of May, to prevent a large quanti- 
ty of sheep from falling into the hands of the British, in which he discover- 
ed great activity and courage ; and on the 10th of June he marched from 
Cambridge to Charlestown, with most of the provincial troops collected at 
the former place. This was done in full sight of the British in Boston, and 
with a view to excite the spirit of emulation and courage in the militia, wh© 
were then assembled in arms for the defence of the country. 

2 



10 

Frescott of Pepperell in the county of Middlesex^ 
Far the greater part of the detachment belonged to 
Massachusetts, and chiefly to that county, and includ- 
ed a part of Colonel Ebenezer Bridge's and a part of 
Frye's regiments, with about 120 from General f 
Israel Futnamh regiment (from Connecticut,) with 
Captain Knmvlton, as their chief officer.* Putnam 
accompanied this detachment, and, according to the 
testimony of several respectable witnesses who were 
in the expedition, had the superintendance of it ; or 
gave direction and advice, which, even if he attended 
as a volunteer, must have had much influence. That 



+ Though called General, he had then command only of a regiment, which 
was the case with several general oflScers in Massachusetts at that time. 
The other Connecticut troops were stationed at Roxbury. 

* Judge Grosrenor, now living, was a lieutenant in this corps, and was 
wounded the next day at the rail fence. The statement lately made by 
liim is as follows : — " I was one of the detachment from General Putnam's 
regiment, posted at Cambridge. On the evening of the 16th June, Captain 
Knowlton, with four subalterns and 120 men, were detached and marched to 
Breed's Hill, with others of Massachusetts. General Futman was with us 
and attended to laying out the ground for erecting the redoubt. He returned 
to Cambridge that night, and attended early the next morning. He was on 
the hill repeatedly during the day ; and particularly at the posting of the 
troops in the redoubt, and at the arm of the ditch leading north towards Mys- 
tic River, and at the rail fence adjoining the river. Colonel Prescott was 
constantly with the troops ; but General Putnam was backwards and for- 
wards from Cambridge during the day, to bring on reinforcements. He 
commanded and ordered the troops engaged with regularity and satisfac- 
tion, so far as I know." — " When the British landed at Moreton's Point, the 
detachment under Knowlton, from Putnam's regiment, was ordered by the 
General to take post at a rail fence on the left of the breastwork. This was 
promptly executed. Each man was furnished with a pound of powiler and 
forty-eight balls. JVo corps was posted at the rail fence, sav^ our own, at 
tht time the fire began." 



11 

iie iiad the official and authorized command,f may be 
sdiffic t to prove by direct evidence. The orderly- 
book of General Ward is silent on the subject. Put- 
nam was a verj^ active as well as brave officer, and 
had seen much military service in a former war be- 
tween France and England. Colonel Gridley was 
also with *he detachment, and acted as engineer. 

This detachment of provincial troops proceeded to 
the peninsula of Charlestown late in the evening of 
the 16th of June. They paused on Bunker Hill ; but 



\ DifTerent opinions have prevailed on this point. But on comparing all 
.<he circumstances and transactions of the occasion, by recollecting the con- 
duct of Putnam, as stated by several persons in the battle, and by other 
citizens who were on Charlestown heights as volunteers, and by assuming 
that such an important enterprise would not have been undertaken by ad- 
vice oftheCouncilofWaror Committee of Safety, without some system (al- 
though the short time there was to make arrangement, and the imperfect 
organization of the American troops prevented it being entirely regular and 
complete,) it will appear that he was, '\nfact, the commander in chief. He 
evidently acted as such ; and either had the appointment by General Ward, 
or by designation and consent of the Council of War. He superintended 
the works the night of the IGth ; was there again early on the morning of 
thelTth ; directed Knowlton to the rail fence, when the enemy landed at 
Moreton's Point ; advised to carry the entrenching tools to Bunker's Hill, 
and there ordered another breastwork to be thrown up, though when the en- 
emy advanced to the attack, he relinquished it, and marched his men to the 
lines ; was seen riding along the hnes, directing and animating the troops ; 
often rode to the Neck and beyond, to urge on the recruits ; and, in com- 
pany with Prescott, covered the rear of the Americans on their retreat. 
Still, perhaps he had not that entire and complete command which would 
have been given, if the army had been perfectly organized, and the expedi- 
tion regularly and maturely prepared.' That he was often on Bunker Hill, 
where he could take a full view of the whole ground and of all the troops en- 
j'aged, both British and American, and rode to the Neck to hasten and urge on 
the reinforcements, instead of remaining posted either at the redoubt or a't 
the rail fence, go to prove rather that he was commander of the expedition, 
Ihan that he was inactive or out of place. 



12 

after some consultation they concluded to advance to 
Breed's Hill, which lies nearer to Boston by about 
120 rods, and is about the same distance from the 
banks of Charles River.* It was nearly midnight 
when they began to throw up a redoubt (as had been 
previously ordered by a Council of War at Cam- 
bridge,) for a partial defence against the British, who 
they could not but believe would soon attack them. 
As a fortress, of which they were to retain permanent 
possession, they could not have proposed it ; for, with- 
out more cannon and a greater supply of ammunition, 
they must have known that they could not long hold 
out against the superior and formidable force of the 
British in Boston. Such was the opinion even of 
the sanguine and heroic Putnam, expressly given by 
him to General Warren, when he came on the field, 
just before the enemy first advanced to the attack. 

In the course of the night, when the works were in 
forwardness and the men industriously engaged in 
completing them, General Putnam returned to his 
quarters in Cambridge. But early in the morning, 
on hearin\:; the cannonade of the British, which began 
soon after the dawn of day, from tlieir fort at the 
northern part of Boston, and their ships of war in 
Charles River, he repaired again with great alacrity 
to Charlestown. During the night. Colonel Prescotty 



♦ In a direct line, Copps' Hill, at the northern part of Boston, where the 
British had a fortress, is about half a mile from Breed's Hill in Charlestown. 
No reason can be given why the Americans chose to fortify Breed's rather 
than Bunker Hill, but that it was nearer to Boston. Bunker Hill is mucb 
more elevated, and would have been lyore difficult to attack by the enemy. 



13 

attended by Major Brooks,^ proceeded to the margin 
of the river, to ascertain whether the British were 
alarmed, and were preparing to attack them ; but all 
appeared quiet. At an early hour of the morning, 
Prescott sent to General Ward,t at Cambridge, for 
provisions and reinforcements. His men were fa- 
tigued, and the works were not finished. No answer 
and no supplies were received. At nine o'clock, 
Major Brooks, as a confidential officer, was despatch- 
ed to head quarters, with an urgent request for more 
supplies and men. But on this message, requiring 
the greatest despatch, he was obliged to travel on 
foot. No horse was to be procured. It was nearly 
ten when he arrived at Cambridge. A consultation 
was immediately had between General Ward and oth- 



* Brooks was major of Bridge's regiment. He commanded a battalion of 
minute men in the affair at Concord on the 19th of April. During the war 
of the revolution, he held a colonel's commission, and was repeatedly distin- 
guished for acts of bravery, and in high estimation as a correct disciplinarian. 
Afterwards he was major geneVal of militia, and governor of Massachusetts. 
He died the first of March last, universally respected and beloved, sincerely 
and deeply lamented. 

t It is argued, that if General Putnam had the regular and official coaa- 
mand of the expedition, lie would have made the request to Ward for pro- 
visions and recruits ; and that Prescott would have applied to Putnam, 
and not to Ward, for any assistance he needed. That Putnam was on the 
field early, there is full proof ; and it also appears that he was active at 
the redoubt, and in his endeavours to bring on more men. It is not improba- 
ble that he joined with Prescott in the message to Ward for reinforce- 
ments. It is evident that there was a want of perfect organization and sys- 
tem in the military movements of the day. But this does not disprove that 
Putnam was considered and acted as commander in chief. And we cannot 
but believe that,as there were commanders of companies and of regiments,and 
as Prescott was stationed at the redoubt, there was a commander in chief of 
the whole, who superintended and directed the movements of all the troops 
concerned in the expedition. 



14 

ers, as to the propriety of sending more troops from 
the main body at that place. It was believed the 
British would avail of the circumstance of a great 
portion of the provincials being at Charlestown, to 
make an attack on Cambridge, by passing directly 
over the bay from the western part of Boston,! dis- 
perse the men retained there, and destroy the scanty 
stores collected ; which would prove a disaster that 
it would be almost impossible to repair. It was con- 
sidered necessary, therefore, to retain a large force at 
Cambridge, notwithstanding the perilous situation 
and urgent request of Putnam and Prescott. 

The remainder of Putnam's regiment, stationed in 
the easterly part of Cambridge, near Inman's farm, 
so called, were very desirous of marching to Charles- 
town ; but General Ward believed their service would 
be more important in checking the British, should 
they come out from Boston and make an attack upon 
head quarters.* At a later hour, however, they were 
permitted to proceed to Charlestown, for the support 
of their fellow citizens there engaged. These were 
commanded by Captains Chester, Coit, and Clark, 
and reached the rail fence, where Knowlton was sta- 
tioned, just as the engagement began. 



f At this time the British had oot landed at Charlestown, and it was un- 
certain where they would make an attack. 

* For a similar reason, no doubt, the provincial troops at Roxbury were 
not ordered to reinforce those at Charlestown. It would have left the 
American camp, in that place, wholly exposed to the British ; who might 
have easily inarched from Boston and made an attack upon it. 



15 

At an early hour in the forenoon, Gardner's regi- 
ment was ordered to proceed down the Charlestown 
road, near the foot of Prospect Hill, and there to re- 
main till further orders should be given them.f In 
this situation they remained until after one o'clock ; 
when, seeing the enemy's boats pass over to Charles- 
town, the Colonel consulted with his officers, and it 
was agreed to march immediately to the heights of 
Charlestown, 

In the meantime, it had been concluded by Gene- 
ral Ward to send to Medford for some New Hamp- 
shire militia, under Colonels Stark and Reed,t who 
were ordered to Bunker Hill, for a support to the men 
already there. It was between ten and eleven o'clock 
when the messenger was despatched from Cambridge 
with these orders. The brave New Hampshire men 
soon prepared to obey. But it was about one o'clock 
when they left Medford ; and must, therefore, have 
been two o'clock, or later, when they reached Bunker 
Hill. They were in season, however, to repair to the 
lines on the left of the redoubt, at the breastwork and 
rail fence (where the Connecticut troops, under Cap- 
tain Knowlton, were, by the special direction of Gen- 
eral Putnam, already stationed,) when the attack 
was first made by the enemy. 

Putnam, who rode to Bunker Hill, and even to the 
Neck, or still farther, to hasten on the reinforcements, 



t Scammons' regiment was ordered to Lechmere's Point, and Little's 
still nearer to the Neck. 

ijiThis proves that Ward had the command of all the men in the vicinity, 
even from other colonies ; or that there was a disposition to act in concertj 
under his direction, for tlie common defence. 



16 

Avhich were requested and expected as soon as the 
British landed at Moreton's Point, met the New 
Hampshire troops, and entreated their immediate 
presence at the lines ; with w hich they as readily com- 
plied. He also probably directed or advised the po- 
sition most suitable for them to take. Parts of Lit- 
tle's regiment, sent on from Cambridge, and of Gard- 
ner's, already mentioned, arrived on Bunker Hill just 
before or about this time, and were directed chiefly 
to the rail fence, but some to the redoubt. At this 
time also it was, or a few moments earlier (for it was 
just before the British made the first attack,) that 
Judge Winthrop saw Putnam and Warren conversing 
together a little in the rear of the eastern part of the 
breastwork, on the left of the fort. A soldier in 
Knowlton's company also states, " that, just as the 
battle began, he saw General Putnam earnestly en- 
gaged in rallying some men, who were retreating to- 
wards Bunker Hill ; and that, after he had drove back 
as many as he could, he rode towards the redoubt." 
In the course of the forenoon, notwithstanding the 
heavy fire of the British from their ships of war, and 
their fort in Boston, a redoubt was thrown up by the 
Americans of about eight rods square, and a breast- 
work, on the left of it, extending down the eastern 
declivity of the hill, about seventy feet. East of this 
breastwork, and a little northerly in the rear of it, 
was the rail fence, at which the few Connecticut men 
were first placed, and afterwards the New Hampshire 
troops and two more companies of the Connecticut 
forces, as well as some belonging to Massachusetts,, 



17 

who came on about the same time.* The rail 
fence stretched almost to Mystick River ; and an ef- 
fort was made by the Connecticut troops, undelf 
Knowlton, to render it something like a protection^ 
by adding another fence in the vicinity, and throwing 
up some grass recently mown against it. 

Colonel Prescott commanded in and at the redoubt, 
which had just been finished under his inspection. 
He had sent two companies down into the street to* 
Wards the ferry way to reconnoitre, but they were 
soon recalled and placed in and near the fort* Some 
of the men, with Prescott, were on the exterior of the 
redoubt, but near it, on the right and left. He seems 
to have had the sole command of this important post, 
while Putnam was urging on the recruits and inspect" 
ing the troops in other parts of the peninsula. 

Not only was the detachment, under Captairt 
Knowlton, ordered to the rail fence on the left, but 
most of the fresh troops which came on to the fieldj 
as reinforcements, were directed to take the same 
position. The redoubt was sufficiently furnished with 
men to act with effect, though deficient in cannon^ 
ammunition, and bayonets, to enable them to repel 
the British who were superior both in numbers and 
equipments. A part of Little^s regiment seems to 
have been the only troops ordered to the redoubt, id 
addition to tfiose stationed there at an earlier hour. 



* It appears, from some accounts, that a part of the New Hampshire mi- 
litia, and those of Massachusetts, were placed at the breastwork, in the 14* 
land l)etween the redoubt and the raU fence. 

3 



Oil the left, at the breastwork and rail fence, a large 
force became indispensable. The movements of the 
British, soon after thej formed for the attack, fully in- 
dicated their purpose to march a large detachment 
near the margin of Mystic River, at a considerable 
distance northeast of the redoubt, and then to make 
an attack in the rear of it. A great portion of their 
troops were so disposed of as soon to render this plan 
most evident ; while another party of them prepared 
to advance directly in front of the redoubt. Prescott 
was in full preparation to receive them at the fort ; 
and all the attention and activity of Putnam were put 
in requisition to meet them on the left, and to prevent 
their advancing in that direction. Accordingly we 
find, from all the testimony given at the time and sub- 
sequently, that General Putnam was making every 
possible effort to forward fresh troops to that quarter. 
For this purpose, soon after the British landed, he 
rode to the Neck and beyond, and urged the scattered 
companies and parts of regiments, which he found, to 
proceed with the greatest despatch to the rail fence 
and to the breastwork on the left of the fort. 

The British were some time in determining upon 
the particular mode of attack, and in forming after 
they had decided ;* it was between two and three 
o'clock when they first advanced to the bloody con- 
test. f This was done in two separate bodies ; one 



* They landed near Moreton's Point, S. E. from Breed's Hill. 

t Botta says the Americans laboured at their entrcncliments during the 
whole day ; and that the British did not make the attack till toicards night. 
He is not entirely correct in this statement. He is also mistaken, in saying. 



19 

directed towards the redoubt of Breed's Hill, and the 
other towards the rail fence on the left and near 
Mystic River. The British began the fire upon the 
provincials when at a considerable distance, and with- 
out much effect. But the latter reserved their fire, 
by the express orders of Putnam and Prescoit, no 
doubt by previous agreement, until the enemy had ap- 
proached within about eight rods ; when they poured 
forth a most destructive volley of small arms, and 
continued it for some minutes (as rank after rank of 
the British succeeded,) by which a great number of 
the assailants were cut to pieces, while comparatively 
few of the Americans received any injury. The Brit- 
ish troops were soon thrown into confusion, and re- 
treated to the margin of the river, where they first 
landed. 

The British officers soon rallied their men, and 
formed anew for a second attack ; during which Gen- 
eral Putnam rode to the Neck to press on such of the 
militia as might have advanced thus fiu*, and some of 
whom were reluctant to march nearer to the place of 
slaughter. The incessant firing of a sloop of war and 
of several floating batteries in CharlesRiver,* render- 
ed it extremely dangerous to pass on to the peninsula. 
Putnam rode over the Neck repeatedly, to show that 



that the British liad floating batteries in Mystic River, and (he Americans a 
r.ompetent artilleiy. 

* It has been supposed by some that there were floating batteries in Mys- 
tie Fiver al^o ; but tiiis was a mistaUe. 



20 

himself was without fear, and that it was possible to 
pass unhurt. 

The British soon advanced a second time as before ; 
a portion towards the redoubt, and others to the 
breastwork and rail fence on the east.f The Amer- 
icans were prepared to receive them with equal reso- 
lution as at the first assault ; and orders were again 
given by Putnam, Prescott, and other officers, to with- 
hold their fire until the enemy should approach even 
nearer than before. The enemy were again repulsed 
with great slaughter. They soon shrunk from the 
tremendous fire of the provincials ;t and a second 
time retreated to the banks of the river. The Brit- 
ish soldiers were discouraged, and were not led on 
again to the attack, but by repeated orders and threats, 
and until a reinforcement arrived from Boston. The 
Americans, on the contrary, were elated by their re- 
peated success ; though the officers must have per- 
ceived the difficulty of long maintaining their position, 
unless they could receive a new supply of ammuni- 
tion and large reinforcements of men. 

The third attack was not made by the British 
without considerable delay. They sent to Boston 
for more troops ; ^^ hich were forwarded, indeed, 
with all possible despatch, accompanied by sev- 
eral officers of high rank and great military skill and 
experience. During this interval, it appears that 



t It was at (his period that the town of Chailestown was set on fire by 
the British, and the whole burnt, consisting of about 500 buildings. 

t The British officer? said the Americans fought like " devils." 



21 

General Putnam again rode to the Neck, and to a 
short distance beyond, where some provincials had 
assembled from the neighbouring towns. Some of 
these were unwilling to proceed, as it was very dan- 
gerous passing the Neck, and as they expected the 
troops on the Heights must soon retreat. At this 
time, also, unfortunately, a part of the artillery, from 
a defect in the apparatus of their guns, or some great 
error in judgment, retired from the field of action ; 
which served to discourage the militia from ad- 
vancing. 

These men belonged to Massachusetts, were im- 
perfectly organized, and unaccustomed to military 
discipline. The resolute and brave, however, readi- 
ly hastened to the relief of those who had already 
been long engaged. Having urged the advance of 
these troops, Putnam returned to those he had left at 
the lines, with the great despatch for which he was 
always distinguished ; and arrived some time before 
the reinforcements came up, to encourage the men 
and to direct their movements on the renewed attack 
of the British, which was then expected. 

In the third and last attack the enemy conducted 
with much deliberation. They were convinced of 
the great importance of their field artillery ; and par- 
ticular care was taken to have it accompany the 
troops. It was taken to the eastern declivity of 
Breed's Hill, between the rail fence and the breast- 
work, where it was directed along the line of the 
Americans at the latter position, and a part pointed 
also into the opening or gate-way of the redoubt, 



22 

which was on the north-eastern corner. The redoubt 
was now attacked also on the south-eastern and south- 
western sides by the enemy with fixed bayonets. 
At the same time, a column of the British advanced 
against the provincials posted at the rail fence on the 
extreme left. 

Those in the redoubt were destitute of bayonets, 
and their powder also was soon expended. In this 
situation, after having made a most resolute resistance 
for some time, but without a possibility of maintain- 
ing their ground, and in hopes of saving the lives of 
his brave men, the intrepid Prescott ordered a retreat. 
To effect this, surrounded as he was by the British, 
was a difficult task. The troops on the left were 
ordered to cover them as they retired.* And this 
important service was performed with ability and 
despatch. Putnam and Prescott^ having braved the 
enemy as long as hope remained, were very active in 
conducting the retreat.f Though many of the 
Americans were killed or wounded by the British 



* The troops at the rail fence were closely engaged with a column of the 
British, when those at the redoubt were obliged to retreat. They fought 
with great bravery, and had hitherto prevented the advance of the enemy, 
whose plan was to force their way and turn this flank of the provincials. 
Here the New Hampshire men under Colonels Stark and Reed, and the 
Connecticut men under Captains Knowlton, Chester, Clark, and Lieutenant 
Grosvenor, gave proofs of a firmness and courage, which richly entitled them 
to the glory of a victory. 

t According to the statement of several persons who were in this battle, 
Tutiiam and Prescolt kept in the rear of the provincials as they retreated, 
and were much exposed to the fire of the British troops, who pursued them 
to Bunker Hill. 



23 

troops, who pursued them to Bunker Hill, a great 
degree of regularity and order was maintained by 
the attention and activity of the officers, t assisted by 
some fresh troops, who arrived at this time. This 
was between six and seven o'clock. Here General 
Putnam proposed to make a stand and fortify ; but 
the plan was too desperate to meet the approbation 
of any other officers. " He wished, at least, to face 
the enemy and give them one more fire before they 
left the peninsula." But the men were too much 
exhausted and too destitute of ammunition to comply 
with his proposal. The provincials, therefore, passed 
over the Neck ; and some posted themselves at Win- 
ter and Prospect Hills, within a mile and a half of 
Bunker Hill, and others proceeded to WarcTs head 
quarters, at Cambridge, a distance of about three 
miles. 

Just at the moment the word was given to retreat, 
General Warren, who was near the redoubt, received 
a musket ball in the head, and immediately expired. 
He was President of the Provincial Congress and of 
the Committee of Safety at this time ; and three days 
before had been appointed a Major General of the 
Massachusetts troops. On this occasion, he was 



\ It is stated, in a report of a committee of the Provincial Congress, 
" that the retreat was conducted with more regularity, than could be expect- 
ed of troops, who had been no longer under discipline, and many of whom 
never before saw an engagement ; and that the retreat of the men from the 
redoubt would have been efifectually cut oS*, had it not happened that the 
flanking party of the enemy was checked by a party of our men, at the rail 
fence, who fought with the utmost bravery." These belonged chiefly to 
Connecticut and New Hampshire. 



24 

merely a volunteer. His ardent and patriotic feelings 
led him to the scene of danger, as soon as he heard of 
the threatened attack. He was among the most emi- 
nent of the many brave men, who, at that critical pe- 
riod, were ready to sacrifice every thing for the liber- 
ties of the country. 

The slaughter, on this occasion, was very great. 
The British had nearly 1500 killed and wounded ; 
and the Americans estimated theirs at about 350. 
Some statements have given different numbers. But 
the above may be considered as very near the truth. 
Governor Gage's account, prepared soon after the 
battle, gave only 3000 in the engagement ; and 1 100 
killed and wounded. It was his policy to make a 
favourable report. From the most accurate calcula- 
tion, it is evident that the whole number of the Brit- 
ish engaged could not have been less than 4500 (some 
suppose about 5000 ;) and soon after the battle it was 
reported and generally believed, that the whole num- 
ber of the enemy killed and wounded amounted to 
1492; ninety of which were commissioned officers. 
Of the provincials, 250 were wounded and 136 killed 
and missing ; thirty of the latter were afterwards 
known to have returned to their respective homes the 
night following the battle. 

Of the officers killed or mortally wounded in the 
provincial regiments, the principal were General 
Joseph Warren, Colonel Thomas Gardner, who 
survived a few days : Lieutenant Colonel Parker, 
who was mortally wounded, and died the week after 



in prison in Boston ; Majors M'Clary and MooRE- 
The numbers of men killed or wounded in the seve- 
ral regiments engaged, were as follows. In Prescotfs^ 
42 killed and 28 wounded ; \\\ Bridget, 16 killed 
and 30 wounded ; in Fryers, 15 killed and 31 wound- 
ed ;* in the detachment from Putnam's regiment, con- 
sisting of about 250, 15 were killed and 30 wounded. 
Of the two New Hampshire regiments, under Stark 
and Reed (the latter of which was not full,) 15 were 
killed and 45 wounded ; in Little's, 7 killed and 23 
wounded ; in Brewer's, 7 killed and 1 1 wounded ; 
in Gardner's, 6 killed and 7 wounded ; in Whit- 
comb's, 5 killed and 8 wounded : and a few belong- 
ing to Nixon's and Gerrish's regiments. 

In referring to the officers, who particularly distin- 
guished themselves on this ever-memorable occasion, 
by their activity, their zeal, and courage, we may just- 
ly name General Israel Putnam of Connecticut; 
Colonels William Prescott, Ebenezer Bridge, 
James Frye, and Moses Little ; Colonels John 
Stark and James Reed, both of New Hampshire ; 
General Pomeroy, Lieutenant Colonels John Rob- 
inson and William Buckminster, Major Henry 
Wood, (General Warren, Colonel Gardner, Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Parker, and Majors M'Clary and 
MooRE, who were slain or mortally wounded in the 
action,) Captains Knowlton, Chester, Coit, and 

* Only parts of Biidg^e's and Frye's regiments were in battle 

4 



26 

Clark, Lieutenants Grosvenor, Keyes, Dana, and 
Hills, all of Connecticut ; Captain Henry Dear- 
born of New Hampshire; and Captains Burnham, 
Trevett, Ford, Walker, Bancroft, and Ensign 
ThOxMas Miller,* &c. Many others exhibited 
great proofs of patriotism and courage, whose names 
it is not in our power particularly to mention. 

The survivors of that brave and heroic band of 
freemen, who made such a resolute stand against the 
British troops, on this occasion, which are recollected 
are General Henry Dearborn, Major John Burn- 
ham, Captain R. Trevett, Judge Grosvenor, Gen- 
eral John Keyes,* Colonel J. Clark, General Ben- 
jamin Pierce, Deacon Thomas Miller, Major 
Daniel Jackson, Captain Benjamin Dana, Philip 
Jackson, Esq. John Brazer, Esq. and Mr. Timo- 
thy Thompson. 

The Americans justly considered this defeat a 
great disaster, but they did not despond. It taught 
them the courage of their men, and the necessity of 
greater discipline and preparation. The want of 
system and of military subordination was fully per- 
ceived. To this, in part, was attributed the final 
failure of that glorious enterprise. It would be un- 
just, perhaps, to accuse any one, then in high civil or 
military authority, of inactivity or vv ant of spirit and 



* Those not of Connecticut or New Hampshire belonged to Massachu- 
setts. 

t General Keyes was living in the state of New York a short time since. 



27 

zeal.f The contest was a glorious one to the Amer- 
icans ; for, unprepared and unfurnished as they were 
with military stores and implements, a different re- 
sult could not have been justly expected. That 
greater reinforcements were not provided, was per- 
haps the fault of no individual. But had they been 
furnished, the British Avould probably have been 
checked and repulsed, in their third attack, as they 
were in the two former. The enemy could boast 
only of having gained possession of the field for which 
they contended. But it was not without double the 
number of men to those whom they engaged. And 
they were convinced, by melancholy facts, that the 
provincials were too brave to be despised, or to be at- 
tacked except by superior numbers, and with every 
advantage of a competent artillery and a full supply 
of military stores. Though the American troops re- 
mained for several months almost wholly without 
cannon, and deficient, to an alarming degree, of the 
essential article of powder, the British made no at- 
tack upon their lines, nor attempted any offensive 
operations. 



t Two colonels and a major of artillery were censured for remissness of 
duty. The artillery was in a very imperfect state, which furnished some apol- 
gy for the inefficiency of the officers, though one of them was justly blamed. 
The two colonels were evidently deficient in that zeal and activity, by which 
a!! the others engaged were distinguished. 



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